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II. ARGUMENT.
I.

PLAINTIFF HAD NO CAUSE OF ACTION UNTIL SHE DISCOVERED HER
INCAPACITY.
A.

Appellant behaved just as appellee's arguments and
authorities would have her behave; in spite of
reasonable diligence, plaintiff could not have
discovered her causes of action until she discovered
her incapacity.

Appellant behaved just as appellee's arguments and
authorities would have her behave to toll the statutes of
limitation.

As appellees argue:

The test for inquiry notice is whether the
circumstances would suggest to a person of ordinary
intelligence that a loss, injury or wrong had occurred.
If so, the plaintiff must be reasonably diligent in
investigating the facts surrounding the loss which
forms the basis of her cause of action.
Appellee's Brief pg. 13 (citing Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (limitation period postponed by belated
discovery of key facts)).

And if one on inquiry notice is

reasonably diligent in investigating the facts surrounding the
loss and still fails to discover the key facts which form the
basis of her cause of action, the statute of limitations is
tolled until she does.

Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 53-55

(Utah 1996).
Here, because of her faith in the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (the Church) and its counsel, plaintiff was not
on inquiry notice.

But even if she was on inquiry notice, she

diligently investigated the facts surrounding her loss and still

4

could not have discovered the facts forming the basis of her
causes of action.
The Church counseled appellant she would ruin the child's
life if she did anything other than submit the child to Social
Services for adoption placement. Appellant's Aff. ^4,

Record on

Appeal pg. 288. Appellant loves and trusts the Church and its
offices.

Appellant's Aff. 1(12, Record on Appeal pg. 289. When

she recovered from her incapacitated state, she learned she had
given her son to Social Services for adoption placement.
no memory of signing the release.
Record on Appeal, pg. 3 02.

She had

Appellant's Aff., exhibit G,

She assumed she had succumbed to the

Church's stern counsel and knowingly released her son to them for
adoption.

She was racked with sorrow and remorse, but if sorrow

and remorse were the standard for inquiry notice, possibly every
birth mother would have grounds to upset every adoption.
Appellant's trust and confidence in the Church removed from
her any suspicion that the Church acted wrongly in obtaining her
consent.

Appellant's Aff. 1(12, Record on Appeal pg. 289. Only

years later when appellant discovered she had been drugged when
she signed the release and discovered the release stated Social
Service could place the child with a single parent did appellant
realize she was incapacitated when Social Services took her
release.

Not until her shocking discovery of Social Services

wrongdoing could appellant possibly have been on notice of her
claims against appellees.
5

Appellees claim that appellant's knowledge she had lost her
son equals knowledge of her injury and thus knowledge of her
claims.

Although appellant obviously was aware she had lost her

son, she was completely unaware of the circumstances under which
Social Services derived her flawed consent;

she was completely

unaware of the facts underlying her causes of action.

But even

if those facts should put her on notice as appellees claim,
appellant made the diligent inquiry appellees would require of
her.
Appellant diligently attempted to discover why she had given
her ostensible consent when all her will belied it.
Aff. 126, Record on Appeal pg. 291.

Appellant's

For example, on January 18,

1967, appellant and her mother visited Social Services to inquire
about appellant's son and the adoption and to inform Social
Services of appellant's sorrow, confusion and regret.

Social

Services failed to inform appellant of her incapacity and failed
to provide any information about how it had obtained appellant's
consent. Appellant's Aff. 127, Record on Appeal pg. 291. After
January 18, 1967, appellant inquired of Social Services through
its various agents approximately thirty more times about her son
and the adoption.

Social Services told appellant it could give

her no other information regarding the adoption or her son.
Appellant's Aff. ^28, Record on Appeal pg. 291-92.
In spite of her dogged diligence in investigating the facts
surrounding the loss, appellant still failed to discover the
6

facts which formed the basis of her cause of action.
of limitations was tolled until she did.
914 P.2d 45, 53-55 (Utah 1996).

Berenda v. Langford,

The quality of appellant's

diligence is a question of fact for the jury.
Club Foods,

The statute

Aragon v. Clover

857 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);

Berenda v.

Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53-55 (Utah 1996).
The District Court erroneously determined appellant could
have obtained her medical records before she did.
Appeal, pg. 390.

Record on

But appellant reasonably believed her records

had been destroyed.

Contrary to the facts as appellees present

them, appellant did not understand Social Services would pay the
costs of her confinement nor did she desire for Social Services
to do so. Appellant asked the hospital to provide her with her
records so she could pay for the costs she and her son had
incurred.

Appellant's Aff. fl3, Record on Appeal pg. 289. The

hospital responded as follows:
Since the records of our no information maternity
patients are destroyed, I can only send you an
estimated amount.
Appellant's Aff. 1l4, Record on Appeal pg. 289. From the
Hospital's reply, appellant reasonably assumed her records had
been destroyed and she could have no access to them.

Appellant's

Aff. 1l5, Record on Appeal pg. 289.
Over 23 years after the birth of her son, appellant and her
son were reunited.
289.

Appellant's Aff. 116, Record on Appeal pg.

Appellant desired to obtain her son's medical records and
7

requested them from the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990.
Appellant's Aff. 1l7, Record on Appeal pg. 289.

In response to

appellant's request, on or about May 29, 1990, the Hospital gave
her copies not of her son's records as she had requested but of
her own records, which she reasonably had assumed were destroyed.
Appellant's Aff. 1l8, Record on Appeal pg. 289. Appellant then
learned for the first time she had been drugged with Thorazine
during her entire Hospital stay.

Appellant's Aff. 1l9, Record on

Appeal pg. 290.
Social Services never had given appellant a copy of the
release.

After she obtained her medical records, in or about

August, 1990, appellant visited Social Services to determine what
documentation, if any, Social Services had of the authority it
claimed in placing appellant's son for adoption.

Appellant then

obtained from Social Services a copy of the release.

Plaintiff's

Aff. i[20, Record on Appeal pg. 290. By matching the release with
her hospital records, appellant discovered for the first time
Social Services had obtained her ostensible consent while
appellant was incapacitated from the effects of the drug
Thorazine.

Appellant later learned that Social Services was

aware of appellant's sedation and affected condition when it
obtained her consent.
pg. 290;

Plaintiff's Aff. ^20, Record on Appeal,

Carling Aff. f1[6 & 9, Record on Appeal, pg. 308.

Appellant was unaware of the facts underlying her claims.
Appellant diligently inquired after her son;
8

she conducted the

very inquiry appellees would ask of her.

Appellant did not and

could not have discovered the facts underlying her claims in
spite of that diligent inquiry.

The discovery rule applies to

toll the applicable statutes of limitation.
B.
Appellant had no claim, including for duress,
until she discovered her flawed consent.
Appellees blithely confess appellant had a cause of action
for duress unrelated to her incapacity which she should have
prosecuted in 1967. Their ironic confession is false.

Neither

appellees nor any court of law would have recognized an action
proved only by plaintiff's sorrow and remorse.

Appellant had no

cause of action until she discovered the key facts of Social
Service's wrongdoing to support her causes of action.
Acting for the Church, Social Services counseled appellant
she would ruin her son's life if she kept him.

When she realized

Social Services had taken her son, appellant was grief-stricken
and confused and inquired diligently about him.

These are the

facts appellees argue appellant was aware of which gave her an
action for duress.

Apparently, appellees argue that if appellant

gave her consent based on the Church's stern counsel and later
regretted her decision, she had an action for duress to upset the
adoption.

Let us hope for the Church that appellees are wrong,

or every birth mother who gives her consent based on Church
counsel and later feels sorrow and remorse may upset the adoption
based on a claim of duress.
9

Although the Church's counsel may be shocking to some, it is
hallowed doctrine to others. As the present facts prove, merely
following that counsel would not support a claim for duress. All
appellant's sorrow, confusion and remorse would not upset the
transaction. Carling Aff. ^11, Record on Appeal, pg. 309. Until
she discovered appellees took her consent while incapacitated she
had no claim, including for duress.
Appellees make a mockery of appellant's faith in the Church
and its counsel.
offices.

Appellant loves and trusts the Church and its

Appellant's Aff. 1l2. Her confidence in the Church and

its offices defeated all suspicion that Social Services had acted
wrongly in the transaction.

Appellant's Aff. 1l2. Until she

obtained her records totally by coincidence, she would not have
dreamed Social Services would have availed itself of her
incapacity.
Appellant's failure to discover her claims sooner was not
from a lack of diligence.

She inquired of Social Services

through its various agents over thirty times regarding the
adoption and her consent.

Social Services repeatedly told her it

could give her no information regarding the adoption or her son.
Carling Aff. Kll, Record on Appeal, pg. 309.

She had no claim

to bring until she learned she had given her consent while
incapacitated.
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the
10

legal cause of her injury.
irrelevant.

The date of her physical injury is

Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, and she

filed timely in May, 1993.
C.

Appellees misstate the facts on appeal.

Appellant did not meet with Social Services to "discuss and
plan the adoption prior to the birth.11

Appellees' Brief, pg. 3.

Appellant sought religious counsel from the Church's Relief
Society, Social Services' predecessor in interest, which she
assumed would respect her confidence and act in her best
interest.

Appellant's Aff. <[4, Record on Appeal pg. 2 88.

She

did not understand she was seeking that counsel from an adoption
agency with numerous conflicts of interest.

The Relief Society

employee who counseled appellant and later took her consent
freely admits appellant had not determined to give the child for
adoption during their counseling.

Carling Aff. %3, Record on

Appeal pg. 308. Nor did appellees take appellant's consent at
her request, as appellees misstate.

Appellees' Brief, pg. 23.

When Social Services took appellant's consent appellant was so
incapacitated she was fainting and had no recollection of the
event.

Appellant's Aff. %8, Record on Appeal pg. 288;

Appellant's Aff. exhibit G, Record on Appeal, pg. 304. And
appellant did not assume Social Services would pay for her
confinement, nor did she desire for them to do so. Appellant
made a special effort to pay the bill herself.
1l3, Record on Appeal pg. 289.
11

Appellant's Aff.

II.

THERE ARE NO OTHER GROUNDS ON WHICH THE COURT MAY AFFIRM THE
DISTRICT COURTS RULING.
A.

Laches does not bar appellant's claims.

Laches would require appellees to prove "both that the
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the
defendant[s were] prejudiced by that delay."
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987).
above and in appellants primary brief,

Here, as argued fully
appellant reasonably

could not have brought her claims sooner.
about August, 1990.

Borland v.

Her claims accrued

Once those claims accrued plaintiff asserted

them immediately and tenaciously.

And, as in Borland, defendants

have failed to show any prejudice.
In Borland, the defendant made no factual showing to support
his arguments that because of the time lapse between the subject
events and plaintiff's claim, he was unable to contact witnesses
and gather documents.

Borland, 733 P.2d at 147. Here,

defendants' similar arguments are unsupported by and contrary to
the uncontroverted facts.

Plaintiff and Gladys S. Carling were

the only witnesses to the transaction.
transaction remarkably clearly.

Mrs. Carling recalls the

Mrs. Carling also made a

contemporaneous record of her impressions regarding the
transaction.

Carling Aff. ^ 8 - 9 ; Record on Appeal pg. 308.

Appellees' argument that their records have been lost or
destroyed is unsupported by affidavit and contrary to the facts
at hand.

Appellees' laches claim must fail.
12

B.

The jury will determine whether defendants' conduct
was sufficiently extreme.

The question of whether appellees' conduct was extreme and
outrageous is a fact questions for the jury.

The jury will

determine whether it was extreme and outrageous for appellees to
take appellant first born son for adoption, without her knowing
consent, during a time of severe emotional and spiritual turmoil,
while she trusted her beloved Church to protect her from the very
type of harm she suffered at its hand.

Samms

v. Eccles, 358

P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961) .
Appellees did not take appellant's consent at her request,
as appellees misstate.

Appellees' Brief, pg. 23. Appellant

sought religious counsel from the Church's Relief Society, Social
Services' predecessor in interest, which she assumed would
respect her confidence and act in her best interest.

She did not

understand she was seeking that counsel from an adoption agency
with numerous conflicts of interest.

The Relief Society employee

who counseled appellant and later took her consent freely admits
appellant had not determined to give the child for adoption when
entered the hospital.

And appellant did not assume Social

Services would pay for her confinement, nor did she desire for
them to do so. Appellant made a special effort to pay the bill
herself.

13

C.

Plaintiff could not and did not ratify the contract.
1.

A contract ostensibly entered without capacity is
no contract at all and cannot be ratified.

"It has been held that a contract entered into without the
power to contract cannot be ratified or enforced and that the
incapacity to contract cannot be removed by estoppel."
Iverson, Inc. v. Bouma, 639 P.2d 47, 60 (Mont. 1982)

Larry C,
citing

Granzow v. Village of Lyons, 89 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1937).
contract is no contract at all;

it binds no one and is a mere

nullity." Isenhower v. Isenhower,
1983).

"A void

666 P.2d 238, 241 (Okl. App.

"Being void the transaction could not be confirmed,

ratified, enforced or rendered enforceable by the application of
any doctrine of estoppel or otherwise." Granzow v. Village of
Lyons. 89 F.2d 83, 87 (7th Cir. 1937)
Here, plaintiff lacked the capacity to contract.

No

contract was ever formed with plaintiff which plaintiff later
could ratify.
2.

The release on which defendants rely is void.
Ratification must be with full knowledge.

"It is indispensable to ratification that the party held
thereto shall have had full knowledge of all the material facts
concerning the transaction."

Romero v. J.W. Jones Construction

Co.. 651 P.2d 1302, 1306 (N.M. 1982);

See also. Elk River

Associates v. Huskin, 691 P.2d 1148 (Colo. App. 1984) (to ratify
party must have full knowledge of the truth regarding the
transaction);

Ward v. Richard & Rossano, Inc., P.S.. 754 P.2d
14

120, 127 (Wash. App. 1988)(can only ratify after discovery of the
facts which would warrant rescission).
Here, appellant had no knowledge or notice of the legal
cause of her injury. She knew she was grief stricken and confused
as to why she allowed the adoption but she was not aware of what
made it void, i.e., her Thorazine induced incapacity.

Plaintiff

had no knowledge or notice of the choice defendants claim she had
to nullify or ratify the void release on which they rely.
3.

Ratification must be with specific intent.

"The mere passage of time does not necessarily establish
ratification."

Ward v. Richards & Rossano, Inc., P.S., 754 P.2d

120, 127 (Wash. App. 1988).

"After possessing the requisite

knowledge, the person sought to be held to a ratification must
act with the intention of ratifying the voidable transaction."
Romero, 651 P.2d at 1306.

Plaintiff was never aware of the

choice she had to void the contract.

She was never aware she

possessed the legal ground on which to do so.

Without that

awareness, she could not intentionally forego that choice and
ratify the contract.

Perhaps the strongest evidence of that is

her reaction to learning the facts making the contract void.

She

immediately and vehemently denied the void contract.
4.

Undue influence in the transaction is presumed to
maintain and taint the possibility of subsequent
ratification.

"In ratification cases where undue influence tainted the
execution of a trust, will, or contract, it is presumed that the
15

undue influence also tainted the ratification if the causative
elements giving rise to the initial undue influence are such that
the undue influence was likely to have continued."
Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Utah 1983).

Robertson v.

For example, in

Ferguson v. Jeanes, 619 P.2d 369, 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), a
religious leader persuaded one of his devotee's to give him money
to form a

partnership with him.

The leader failed to pay her as

agreed but continually reassured her the payments would be
forthcoming.

The devotee trusted the leader's assurances so she

delayed to investigate her possible legal rights against the
leader.

The court found the devotee's agreement was caused by

the leader's undue influence achieved in the name of the
religion.

The same trust and confidence which caused the devotee

first to enter the contract also caused her delay in pursuing her
legal rights.

Ferguson, 619 P.2d at 374. Her delay did not

ratify the contract.
Here, appellant had trust and confidence in Social Services
as an agent of the church to which she was and remains devoted.
Although she was hurt and confused, her faith in the Church
removed any suspicion of wrongdoing.

It never would have

occurred to her that her Church would avail itself of her
incapacity.

Social Services' extraordinary influence overcame

the instinct she otherwise would have had to inquire into any
wrongdoing.

That influence never waned.

16

She did not and could

not know of her remedy until fate gave her knowledge of her
claims.
D.

Plaintiff seeks appropriate equitable and legal relief.

Appellees erroneously assert this Court may affirm the
District Court's ruling dismissing appellant's claims because
appellant seeks emotional distress damages inappropriately.

To

the contrary, appellant seeks legal and equitable relief as
appropriate to each of her causes of action.
1.

In contract/ equity will allow the Court to return
the parties to their precontract position;
when restitution is impractical or
impossible, damages will substitute.

Plaintiff requests the Court to rescind this void contract
and return the parties to their pre-contract position.

Harden v.

Harden, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984)(purpose of equity action is
to restore the parties to the status

quo ante

to the extent

possible). "The rule of returning the parties to the status
ante

quo

is equitable and it requires the use of practicality in the

readjustment of the parties7 rights."

Earthinfo v. Hydrosphere

Resourse, 900 P.2d 113, 118-19 (Colo. 1995).

"Since rescission

is an equitable remedy, it is within the trial court's sound
discretion to determine the method for accomplishing a return to
the status

quo ante

trier of fact."

based upon the facts as determined by the

Id.

Here, plaintiff's precontract position was as the mother of
a healthy baby boy, set to enjoy all the incidental benefits of
17

that relationship, including the economic benefits to be derived
and the love

and companionship inherent in the mother, son

relationship.

The Court cannot reverse time and physically

restore plaintiff's son to her.

But damages may provide a

sufficient remedy when restitution is impossible.

50 West

Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171. The Court
can restore to plaintiff the economic value of her lost rights.
See Earthinfo, 900 P.2d at 118-19 (court ordered return of
computer software and all proceeds and technology derived from
it) .
The loss one suffers from the wrongful death of a minor
child is a perfect analogy.

Utah recognizes that loss of a minor

child includes the loss of the services, love and companionship,
care and support the plaintiff would have had from the child.
Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 106-08 (Utah 1982);

Corbett v.

Oregon Short Line R. Co., 71 P. 1065, 1067 (Utah 1903); Beaman v.
Martha Washington Mining Co., 63 P. 631, 632-33 (Utah 1901).
2.

In tort, plaintiff seeks to recover damages which
are the reasonably foreseeable consequence of
defendants' tortious conduct.

Appellant seeks to recover only for the direct injury to her
caused by defendants' tortious conduct.
641 P.2d 105, 106-08 (Utah 1982).

See Jones v. Carvell,

She does not seek to recover

for any loss to her caused by injury to another, such as in an
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress as
appellees would misconstrue her claims. And although
18

compensation for mental pain and suffering is always allowed when
caused by a direct injury to that plaintiff, Judd v. Rowley's
Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980); See
First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d
591, 597-98 (Utah 1982)(mental anguish damages allowed in case of
bank's wrongful attachment of assets), that is not the crux of
plaintiff's damage claims.
Here, the damages which are the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of defendants' tortious conduct are the loss of the
services, love and companionship of her first born child and the
torment and anguish which accompanied that loss.
Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 106-08 (Utah 1982);

See Jones v.

See also Adcox v.

Children's Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Center, 864 P.2d 921, 932
(Wash. 1993) ($1.2 million medical injury award for destroying
significant aspects of the mother-child relationship).

That is

what plaintiff is entitled to and that is all that she claims.
III.

THE CROSS-APPEAL -- THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
PARAGRAPH 8 -- REGARDING APPELLEE'S MOTION REGARDING
GLADYS S. CARLING'S AFFIDAVIT.
Appellees cross-appeal from paragraph 8 of the summary

judgment order in which the District Court ruled:
8.
With the granting of the Motion for Summary
Judgment, defendants' separate Motion for Protective
Order, Sanctions and to Quash Subpoena is rendered
moot.
Record on Appeal, pg. 370.
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The District Court ruled only that appellees' motion was
moot;

the District Court did not rule on the motion's merits.

That is the only order from which appellees may appeal.
Regardless, the motion also fails on its merits.
A.

Background.

Gladys S. Carling is not a defendant as appellees
erroneously assert.

She is a former employee of the Church's

Relief Society, predecessor in interest to defendant Social
Services.

Carling Aff. ^[ A. Record on Appeal pg. 306.

It is

undisputed that Mrs. Carling left the Relief Society's employ 24
years ago.
B.

The District Court correctly ruled the issue is moot.

A case is moot when the relief requested cannot affect the
litigants' rights.

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057, 1058

(Utah App. 1994) . A claim is unripe for consideration "where
there exists no more than a difference of opinion regarding the
hypothetical application of [the rule] to a situation in which
the parties might, at some future time, find themselves..."
Boyle v. National Union Fire Insurance Co..

866 P.2d 595, 598

(Utah App. 1993) . Here, appellees' motion is moot as it appears
in this Court.

If this Court upholds the trial court's ruling,

appellants claims will be dismissed and there will be no more
justiciable controversy among the parties on the subject. Mrs.
Carling's affidavit and any further contact with her will be
without effect.

If this Court upsets the trial court ruling and
20

remands the matter for further hearing, the trial court can
consider and rule on appellees' motion as the need arises,
C.

The motion fails on its merits; counsel may contact
Gladys s. Carling as the rules otherwise allow.

Utah Code of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 does not apply to
former employees.

Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank,

139 F.R.D. 412 (D. Utah 1991)(interpreting the Utah State rule).
In 1991, the American Bar Association, Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, issued the following formal opinion
which the United States District Court for the District of Utah
specifically applied to the Utah rule:
While the committee recognizes that persuasive
policy arguments can be and have been made for
extending the ambit of Model Rule 4.2 to cover some
former corporate employers, (sic) the fact remains that
the text of the Rule does not do so and the comment
gives no basis for concluding that such coverage was
intended. Especially where, as here, the effect of the
Rule is to inhibit the acquisition of information about
one's case, the Committee is loath, given the text of
Model Rule 4.2 and its Comment, to expand its coverage
to former employees by means of liberal interpretation.
Accordingly, it is the opinion of the Committee
that a lawyer representing a client in a matter adverse
to a corporate party that is represented by another
lawyer may, without violating Model Rule 4.2,
communicate about the subject of the representation
with an unrepresented former employee of the corporate
party without the consent of the corporation's lawyer.
Shearson, 139 F.R.D. at 417.
Only employees whose present conduct can be imputed to the
corporate defendant are considered imputable parties to the
litigation with whom opposing counsel may have no ex parte
21

contact.

Shearson, 139 F.R.D. at 417. The rule does not apply

to former employees.

Id.

Here, Mrs. Carling has not been an

employee of Social Services for 24 years.

Counsel's contacts

with her are allowed and appropriate.
Plaintiff's counsel first contacted Mrs. Carling on April 8,
1996.

Hackwell Aff. ^3; Record on Appeal, pg. 347. Mrs. Carling

did not ask if she was a "Doe" defendant.

Hackwell Aff. i|4;

Record on Appeal, pg. 347. She asked if she was being sued and
plaintiff's counsel instructed her she was not. Id. Counsel
explained to Mrs. Carling she was a witness in the case and could
talk to counsel or not, as she desired.

Hackwell Aff. 15; Record

on Appeal, pg. 348. Mrs. Carling stated her willingness to talk
with plaintiff's counsel and to testify if she were subpoenaed
for that purpose.

Hackwell Aff. 1(6; Record on Appeal, pg. 348.

Counsel informed Mrs. Carling plaintiff required an affidavit to
support plaintiff's opposition to defendants' summary judgment.
Hackwell Aff. \l-,

Record on Appeal, pg. 348. Mrs. Carling

stated she would give her affidavit.
Mrs. Carling informed counsel she had been contacted and
interviewed by Mr. Nelson.

Hackwell Aff. 1|8; Record on Appeal,

pg. 348. She did not inform plaintiff's counsel Mr. Nelson
represented her because that was not the case.
Record on Appeal, pg. 348.

Hackwell Aff. 1(8/

She stated Mr. Nelson asked if

plaintiff's counsel had contacted her.

Hackwell Aff. i|9; Record

on Appeal, pg. 348. And, as was accurate at the time, Mrs.
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Carling told Mr. Nelson plaintiff's counsel had not contacted
her.

Hackwell Aff. i[9; Record on Appeal, pg. 348. Mr. Nelson

did not instruct her not to speak with plaintiff's counsel. Nor
could he, because Mrs. Carling is not a defendant and is not
represented by Mr. Nelson or Kirton & McConkie.

As is clear from

the affidavit which defendants' counsel prepared for Mrs.
Carling, when Mr. Nelson interviewed Mrs. Carling last
Fall he instructed her he represented the defendants.
Second Aff. 14; Record on Appeal, pg. 325.

Carling

He did not instruct

her he represented her as a party to the lawsuit.
When Mrs. Carling met with appellees' counsel, Merrill F.
Nelson, she engaged her own counsel to accompany her.
Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. %^ 1 & 2;

Record on Appeal, pg. 344. She

stated did not understand what Mr. Nelson had meant by "D.O.E"
defendant.
344.

Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 15; Record on Appeal, pg.

She stated emphatically to Mr. Nelson he had not informed

her she was part of the defense.
Record on Appeal, pg. 345.

Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. %1;

She stated emphatically to Mr. Nelson

that never once had she told Mr. Nelson she would be any part of
the defense.
345.

Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 1(8/ Record on Appeal, pg.

She stated emphatically to Mr. Nelson she would not sign an

affidavit saying she was part of the defense.
Aff. %9;

Plaintiff's Supp.

Record on Appeal, pg. 345. Mr. Nelson became irate,

threw papers he had prepared to the ground and stated this had
destroyed his day.

Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 1l0; Record on
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Appeal, pg. 345.

She felt Mr. Nelson was trying to scare her and

made her believe if the defendants lost the case they would come
after her.
345.

Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. fll; Record on Appeal, pg.

She stated Mr. Nelson attempted to twist her meaning.

Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 16; Record on Appeal, pg. 345. Finally,
Mrs. Carling's counsel instructed her to sign Mr. Nelson's draft
of the affidavit to get it over with and explain and clarify the
affidavit later.

Plaintiff's Supp. Aff. 1l2; Record on Appeal,

pg. 345.
Mrs. Carling is an important witness to this lawsuit.

She

will not be a party to this lawsuit unless appellees make her
one.

Until she is made a party, or until she engages counsel,

plaintiff's counsel may contact Mrs. Carling as he desires.
VII.

CONCLUSION.

Social Services obtained appellant's release when it knew or
should have known appellant lacked the capacity to give it. By
her continuing trust and confidence in the Church, appellant
lacked all suspicion the Church or its offices had acted wrongly.
But she was aware she had lost her son and was aware of her
sorrow and remorse, so she diligently inquired regarding her
loss.

Appellees shunned her many inquiries. Appellant

reasonably believed her medical records had been destroyed.

In

spite of her diligent inquiry, she did not and could not have
discovered the key facts of her causes of action until fate
revealed them to her.

The District Court erred in paragraphs 2
24

through 7 of its order granting appellees7 motion for summary
judgment and appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse
that error.
The District Court correctly ruled that appellees' motion
regarding Mrs. Carling's affidavit is moot.
fails on its merits.

Even so, the motion

Utah's Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2

does not apply to former employees of institutional defendants.
The rule prevents only contact with present employees whose
present conduct is imputable to the defendant. Appellees motion
has no merit or effect, in this or the District Court.
Respectfully submitted on April 8, 1997.

krd G. Hackwell
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